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During roughly the last century, large increases in real per capita income have occurred in the currently high-
income countries.  R&D has been the source of improvements in existing goods and the introduction of new 
goods. Only recently has the full importance of successful new goods to economic growth been discovered. 
Not all seemingly useful new goods, however, have been adopted. For example, genetically modified (GM) 
foods have been engulfed in considerable controversy, and the early optimism has been dampened. 
Information issues￿labeling and asymmetric information￿are central to the GM-food debate. Furthermore, 
it is important to understand the reaction in developed countries to GM-foods because they set the tone of the 
world market in grains, oilseeds, and animal products. 
 
New and important results are reported from a statistical analysis of the market characteristics that push 
consumers in a high-income country to resist GM foods, with an emphasis on negative information from 
environmental groups and third-party, verifiable information, which could neutralize misinformation. For 
this study, a unique sample of adult consumers participated in laboratory (random nth price) auctions of three 
food products where labeling and information treatments were randomly assigned to experimental units. A 
key finding is that negative GM-information supplied by environmental groups pushes some high income 
consumers out of the market for GM products and increases the probability that all consumers are out of the 
market. However, verifiable information dampens the effectiveness of negative GM-product information. 
Hence, a vocal interested source can stymie technology adoption in both rich and poor countries and increase 
the probability of general malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies and starvation and unsustainable 
development in poor countries because of the failure to accept food aid and adopt new GM technology.  
 
The standard of living in the United States and other presently high-income industrialized countries 
increased dramatically over the roughly last century (Pritchett 1997). For example, per capita real income in 
the US is about 9 times larger in 1990 than in 1870. There are two issues here. One is the rising per capita 
investments in all forms of capital, and the other is the availability and price of consumer goods and services.  
Over this period of time, and especially since World War II, private sector R&D produced many 
improvements in existing goods and many new goods. Boskin et al 1998 concluded that in the post-War II 
era, the CPI had been biased upward significantly by unaccounted for changes in the quality of goods and 
using the unadjusted CPI biases downward the growth in real income. The full extent of the importance of 
the introduction of new goods has, however, only recently been uncovered.  See Hausman 1996, 2003.  
 
Not all new goods, however, have been adopted, presumably because consumers judged that they would be 
worse off consuming the new good than with traditional goods. In the United States, opposition to 
pasteurization of milk at the beginning of the twentieth century was widespread, with opponents saying, 
among other things, that pasteurization was not needed and that consumers had the ￿right to drink raw milk￿ 
(see Hotchkiss 2002). Pirtle (1926) notes that the slow adoption of pasteurization resulted in thousands of 
deaths that could have been prevented at a very low social cost.  
 
The early prospects for nuclear power were good, but major and persistent resistance developed in Europe 
and the US to electricity generated by nuclear power (see Gr￿bler1996).  Although nuclear power is 
relatively cheap to produce and low in traditional environmental pollutants, e.g., CO2, nitrous oxides, sulfur 
oxides, environmental groups like Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth have lobbied and demonstrated 
against using the technology.  Ruttan (2001) indicates that these groups helped increase the public￿s risk perception of nuclear power in the 
US, forcing stringent safety standards to be enacted that contributed to a quadrupling of plant costs in just 
less than a decade. No new nuclear power plants have been ordered in the US since 1978. 
 
The image problems of nuclear power have carried over to irradiated foods during the past decade. Although 
irradiation of meat and poultry essentially eliminates all harmful to human-health bacteria like e-coli and 
salmonella, it has encountered stiff resistance (Nestle 2002; Fox 2002). Failing to irradiate meat and poultry 
has resulted in a significant number of annual deaths that were preventable at small marginal social cost.  
 
New food products produced using genetic modifications have also been engulfed in controversy. Starting 
with their name, the process is sometimes referred to as genetically engineered, genetically modified, 
bioengineered, GMO, or just GM. Since the beginning of farming, farmers and other have been genetically 
modifying plants to enhance the quantity of desirable attributes. However, since the early 1990s, genetic 
modification has been associated with a much narrower set of techniques for genetic modification that use 
recombinant DNA or gene splicing technology which facilitates the transfer of genes across species.
1 Foods 
made using this type of genetically modified material have become known commonly as GM. 
 
The early potential looked promising for GM-products, and the US, Canada, Argentina and a few other 
countries pursued promotional policies. For example in the US over 1995 to 2001, the share of US soybean, 
cotton, and corn acreage planted to GM-varieties has increased from a negligible amount to 70+ percent for 
soybeans, 56+ percent for cotton, and 26+ percent for corn (USDA 2002; Fernandez-Cornejo and McBride 
2002)). However, resistance from Greens, international environmental NGOs, and consumer groups based 
largely in Europe and by international donors serving developing countries surfaced in the mid-and-late 
1990s. International environmental NGOs, lead by Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and Action Aid have 
been vocal opponents of agricultural biotechnology, creating websites, holding protests, issuing press 
releases, and burning down field trials of new genetically modified crops. One argument they make is that 
￿customers must have the right to know￿ what foods are genetically modified (Greenpeace, 1997). Another 
argument is to pursue the ￿precautionary principle,￿ which emphasizes potential harmful effects but ignores 
real benefits that currently would occur to producers and others (Paarlberg 2001; Johnson 2002). The 
European Union has been swayed by these arguments (Hoban 1998; Paarlberg 2002). WTO court cases will 
undoubtedly decide the extent of the EU￿s power to limit imports of GM-food products. 
 
In 2002, the fears of the high-income EU consumers of GM-products created an obstacle to the acceptance of 
food aid by poor southern African countries and also to new agricultural technologies built on biotechnology 
(Paarlberg 2002; BBC news 2002; Editors, Nature Biotechnology 2002; Editors, Economists 2002; Johnson 
2002).
2 The reason is that food aid from the US may contain GM-technology and make it difficult for 
southern African countries to convince the EU that their products are GM free. Hence, consumers￿ 
acceptance, especially in high income countries, has been an important issue because it has direct effects on 
the demand for GM-products in these countries and indirect effects on demand in developing countries that 
hope to export to the EU.
3 If developing countries have their native varieties contaminated with genetically 
modified materials, they may be unable to export to developed countries. Alternatively, the EU may demand 
expensive testing and identity preservation which developing countries cannot afford.
4 
 
Hence, understanding consumers￿ acceptance of GM-foods in the developed countries is important. In 
particular, during the last decade Greenpeace and Friends-of-the Earth have lobbied and demonstrated 
against GM technologies and foods, frequently arguing for labeling of foods with GM content. The 
agricultural biotech industry has also promoted GM-technology and foods and lobbied against labeling. The 
labeling issue encompasses the effects on consumer demand and ag biotech companies of ￿plain labels,￿ 
which are silent about potential GM content; labels stating that a food contains ￿genetically modified (GM) 
organisms;￿ or the food is ￿GM-free,￿ which is interpreted to mean that a food has no or minimal GM 
content (that does not exceed an agreed upon threshold, e.g., 1% or 5% impurity).  
 
Asymmetric information is central to the GM-controversy. Interested parties￿the biotech industry and 
environmental groups--disseminate GM-information through various media that promotes their particular 
private interests, and there has been much debate about what effects this information has on the demand for 
GM-technologies and foods. Consumers and farmers, however, are exposed to this information, as they make 
purchasing decisions. The consequences of technology and new product adoption decisions can be great, affecting the welfare of 
current and future generations. This paper examines the market characteristics that push consumers in high 
income countries to resist GM foods, with an emphasis on negative information from environmental groups 
and third-party, verifiable information (see Huffman and Tegene 2002). For this study, unique data were 
collected from adult consumers in the United States who participated in laboratory auctions of three food 
types with randomly assigned labeling and information treatments. Using U.S. consumers is important 
because U.S. consumers are generally supportive of GM foods and free from the BSE ￿food scare￿ fears and 
bias towards ￿natural￿ that are hypothesized to lead Europeans to reject GM foods. Key findings are that 
negative GM-product information supplied by environmental groups pushes some consumers out of the 
market for GM products and increases the probability that all consumers are out of the market for GM-foods. 
Verifiable information dampens the effectiveness of negative GM-product information. An important finding 
is that negative information on GM foods from environmental groups, an interested source, can stymie 
technology adoption in both rich and poor countries, and increase the probability of malnutrition and 




We develop a model of consumer demand for food which includes a time- invariant linear individual- and 
country-specific unobserved effect. By randomly assigning information treatments to experimental units, we 
can compare the before and after treatment effects. By differencing the data before model estimation we 
remove any linear time-invariant individual- or country-specific unobserved effect, and this method leads to 
unbiased and consistent estimates of information treatment effects on the demand for GM-foods (Wooldridge 
2002, pp. 299-314). 
 
Consumers might react differently to GM content in different types of food or they might dislike some food 
products. Therefore using only one food item in a laboratory auction seemed unlikely to reveal enough 
information, given the sizeable fixed cost of conducting the experiment. Three food items were chosen for 
our willingness to pay (WTP) auctions: vegetable oil (made from soybeans), tortilla chips (made from yellow 
corn), and russet potatoes. In the distilling and refining process for vegetable oils, essentially all of the 
proteins (which are the components of DNA and the source of genetic modification) are removed leaving 
pure lipids. Minimal human health concerns should arise from GM oil, but consumers may either worry that 
GM soybeans affect the environment or lack adequate information on the distilling process. Tortilla chips are 
highly processed foods that may be made from GM or non-GM corn, and consumers might have human 
health and environmental concerns about this product. Russet potatoes are purchased as a fresh product and 
are generally fried or baked before eating. Similar to tortilla chips, consumers might see both human health 
and environmental risks from eating GM-russet potatoes. 
 
We are interested in the effects of GM-food labels and information about GM-technology and products on 
consumer demand for food products that might be genetically modified. In our experiments, the two labels￿
GM and plain---were clearly displayed on the fronts of each food package (see figure 1).  
 
A one-page summary organized under five different headings￿general information, scientific information, 
human impact, financial impact, and environmental impact-- was prepared for pro-GM information from 
Monsanto and Syngenta, large agribusiness companies; anti-GM information from Greenpeace, a leading 
environmental group and NGO opposing genetic modification; and independent, third-party or verifiable 
information from informed but financially disinterested sources. (See Figure 2-4 in Appenix)  
 
This information was organized into six information treatments: pro-GM, anti-GM, pro-GM and anti-GM, 
pro-GM and verifiable, anti-GM and verifiable, and all three types. The six information treatments were 
randomly assigned to experimental units, which consisted of 12 to 16 individuals.  
 




Figure 5.  Steps in the experiment. We follow standard experimental auction valuation procedures (Smith 1976; Shogren et al. 1994), but make 
refinements to the design to better reflect consumer purchases. A summary is presented here, and details are 
in Rousu et al. (2002). First, our subjects submitted only one bid per product. We have stepped back from the 
protocol of using multiple, repeated trials and posted market-clearing prices to avoid any question of creating 
affiliated values which can affect the demand-revealing nature of a Vickrey-style auction (List and Shogren 
1999). Second, endowment effects are minimized. We do not endow our subjects with a food item and then 
ask them to ￿upgrade￿ to another food item because that methodology can cause distorted bid prices (see List 
and Schroeder 2002 or Corrigan and Rousu 2003). 
 
As is the trademark for economics experiments, subjects were paid a participation fee, $40. Instead of 
endowing participants with food and having them bid to ￿upgrade￿ to another food item, we asked 
participants to bid on food items in only two trials. This avoids the risk of an in-kind endowment effect and 
of any credit constraint. Third, consumers bid on three unrelated food items: vegetable oil, corn chips and 
russet potatoes. We can obtain useful information on their tastes for genetic modification even if a subject 
disliked one or two products. Fourth, treatments are randomly assigned to experimental units, and estimation 
of treatment effects is simply the difference in means across treatments (Wooldridge 2002). We also 
randomize within treatments (e.g., order of pro- and anti-biotech information when an experimental unit 
received both types). Verifiable information, however, was always presented last. 
 
Fifth, adult consumers over 18 years of age from two large metropolitan areas in the U.S. were chosen as 
participants by a random digit-dialing method. Although it is of secondary importance to the results that we 
obtain, the demographics of our sample taken from two major cities do not match perfectly the Census 
demographic characteristics for these two regions, they are similar and provide a sufficient representation for 
our probe into labeling and information effect on the demand for GM-products.
 (See Appendix A for means 
of attributes of survey areas). We use common food items available to shoppers in grocery stores and 
supermarkets, and prefer adults who are not primarily college students. Although Lusk and Schroeder (2002) 
and Fox et al. (2002) used college undergraduates in laboratory auctions of food items, students are not 
typical grocery store shoppers. They are 8.5 percent of shoppers versus 12.8 percent in the Census of 
Population. Katsaras et al. (2001) showed that women make up a disproportionate share of grocery store 
shoppers. A sample primarily of grocery store shoppers also weakens the sometimes-stated need for having 
students participate in several rounds of bidding to stabilize bids for food items and minimizes the 
Hawthorne effect in bidding (Melton et al. 1996), i.e.,  the methodology minimizes the chance that 
participants change their behavior only because they participate in an experiment with specific objectives. 
 
Sixth, a Vickrey 2nd price auction is frequently used in WTP experiments, but it does not engage off the 
margin bidders. For new products, researchers are interested in the location of the completed demand 
curve￿not just one segment. We use the random nth price auction which has the advantage that it is demand 
revealing in theory, and the auction attempts to engage bidders at all locations along the demand curve 
(Shogren et al. 2001). For example, each of k bidders submits a bid for one unit of a good; for instance, if the 
monitor randomly selects n = 5 <= k, the four highest bidders each purchase one unit of the good priced at 
the fifth-highest bid. This random nth price auction increases the odds that insincere bidding will lead to a 
loss. 
 
Finally, information from our laboratory experiments is complemented by information obtained from pre- 
and post-experiment questionnaires administered to participants. The pre-auction survey allowed us to obtain 
socio-demographic information and information on participants￿ beliefs about GM and other technologies 
before treatment, which is useful to help explain bidder behavior. The post-auction questionnaire allowed us 
to obtain information from participants about sources they would trust to provide verifiable information, a 
concept introduced in the experiment. Table 1.  Characteristics of the Auction Participants (N=172) 
 
Variable Definition  Mean  St.  Dev 
Gender  1 if female  0.62  0.49 
Age  The participant￿s age  49.50  17.5 
Married  1 if the individual is married  0.67  0.47 
Education  Years of schooling  14.54  2.25 
Household  Number of people in participant￿s household  2.78  1.65 
Income  The household￿s income level (in thousands)  57.00  32.60 
White  1 if participant is white  0.90  0.30 
Read_L*  1 if never reads labels before a new food purchase  0.01  0.11 
  1 if rarely reads labels before a new food purchase  0.11  0.31 
  1 if sometimes reads labels before a new food purchase  0.31  0.46 
  1 if often reads labels before a new food purchase  0.37  0.48 
  1 if always reads labels before a new food purchase  0.20  0.40 
Informed*  1 if an individual considered him/herself at least 
somewhat informed regarding GM foods 
0.42 0.49 
Labels1  1 if the treatment bid on foods with GM labels in Round 
1 
0.52 0.50 





The model is one of a consumer demand function for food containing an unobserved individual- and 
country-specific effect with information as one determinant of demand. The assumption is that negative 
information shifts a consumer￿s demand function to the left or downward and verifiable information shifts it 
to the right or upward. The key hypotheses are: 1) Negative GM-information from NGOs increases the 
frequency of consumers ￿being out of the market￿ for one unit of a GM-food item and increases the 
probability of consumers being out of the market for all GM-food items, and 2) third-party, verifiable 
information dampens the effects of negative information on consumers. We define a consumer being ￿out of 
the market￿ for a GM-food item as occurring when s/he bids zero for one unit of GM-product (a strong test) 
or less than or equal to two-thirds their bid for plain-labeled product (a weaker test). . 
 
If a consumer does not have a positive WTP for one unit of a GM food when he/she has a positive WTP for 
the non-GM counterpart, this suggests he/she would not consume the GM variety of the product at any price. 
Determining what affects the probability of being out of the market is important, because if the rate of 
consumers￿ purchase of food items is too low, the grocery store will discontinue carrying, stocking, or 
supplying the food item. The weaker test assumes that a consumer is out of the market if the price an 
individual bids for the GM-labeled food is less than or equal to two-thirds of the price he/she bids for the 
plain-labeled food item. This weaker test captures the reality that premiums for non-GM foods generally do 
not exceed 20 percent (Kiesel et al. 2002). The empirical evidence that we are looking for is contained in 
actual frequencies of consumer bids and probit models explaining the probability of a consumer being out of 
the market for one or more GM-food items (Wooldridge 2002). RESULTS 
 
First, we examine mean bids of participants. In table 2, part A, the mean bid prices for all participants are 
displayed. Consumers, on average, discounted GM-labeled foods by fourteen percent. Part B shows that 
participants who received only positive information actually put a premium on the GM-labeled food for two 
of the three products. This was despite the fact that the genetic modification was only used to enhance the 
production process, and did not give the foods any enhanced nutrient or food safety attributes. Part C shows 
that when consumers received only negative information, they discount the GM-labeled foods by an average 
of approximately thirty-five percent. Part D shows that consumers who received both positive and negative 
information discount the GM-labeled foods by an average of seventeen to twenty-nine percent, depending on 
the food product. 
Table 2.  Mean bids for participants, excludes double-zero bids. 
 
A.  Mean bids ￿ all participants. 
 
  n  mean bid  std. dev.  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 146  1.24  0.78  1.00  0  3.79 
GM CHIPS    155  1.03  0.85  0.99  0  3.99 
CHIPS    155  1.20 0.81  1.00 0.05  4.99 
GM POTATOES  159  0.84  0.66  0.75  0  3 
POTATOES   159  0.98  0.65  0.89  0  3.89 
 
B.  Mean bids when participants only received positive information. 
 
  n  mean bid  std dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 26  1.54  0.79  1.55  0  3.50 
GM CHIPS    30  1.31  0.72  1.13  0  2.99 
CHIPS   30  1.36  0.72  1.18  0.05  2.99 
GM POTATOES  27  1.30  0.71  1.25  0  2.50 
POTATOES   27  1.26  0.67  1.25  0  2.00 
 
C.  Mean bids when participants only received negative information. 
 
  n  mean bid  std dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 26  1.22  0.65  1.00  0.25  2.49 
GM CHIPS    29  0.81  0.94  0.50  0  3.99 
CHIPS   29  1.25  1.02  1.00  0.05  4.99 
GM POTATOES  29  0.61  0.68  0.50  0  2.75 
POTATOES   29  0.98  0.88  0.75  0.05  3.89 
 
D.  Mean bids when participants received both positive and negative information. 
 
  n  mean bid  std dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 24  0.90  0.72  0.85  0  3.00 
GM CHIPS    23  0.68  0.74  0.35  0  2.25 
CHIPS   23  0.81  0.79  0.49  0.05  2.75 
GM POTATOES  26  0.50  0.39  0.50  0  1.50 
POTATOES   26  0.70  0.43  0.50  0.05  1.60 
 E.  Mean bids when participants received both positive and third-party information 
 
    n  mean bid  std dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 26  1.14  0.57  1.00  0.10  2.39 
GM CHIPS    25  1.24  0.77  1.19  0  2.79 
CHIPS   25  1.33  0.73  1.16  0.20  2.89 
GM POTATOES  26  0.92  0.45  0.99  0  1.85 
POTATOES   26  0.93  0.39  0.99  0.25  1.90 
 
F.  Mean bids when participants received both negative and third-party information 
 
  n  mean bid  std dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 21  1.60  0.97  1.50  0.49  3.79 
GM CHIPS    25  1.12  0.97  0.99  0  3.50 
CHIPS   25  1.38  0.77  1.01  0.49  3.00 
GM POTATOES  27  0.89  0.77  0.89  0  3.00 
POTATOES   27  1.14  0.67  0.99  0.50  3.00 
 
G.  Mean bids when participants received positive, negative and third party information 
 
  n  mean bid  std dev  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
 













OIL 23  1.06  0.82  1.00  0.05  3.29 
GM CHIPS    23  0.95  0.81  0.85  0  3.25 
CHIPS   23  0.95  0.66  0.99  0.1  2.89 
GM POTATOES  24  0.82  0.61  1.00  0  1.99 
POTATOES   24  0.84  0.55  0.84  0.01  2.00 
 
Third-party information has an impact on the willingness to pay for GM-labeled foods. Part E shows that 
consumers who received positive and third-party information discounted GM-labeled foods slightly. This is 
in contrast to the consumers who received only positive information who valued the GM-labeled foods more 
than their plain-labeled counterpart on average. Part F shows that participants who received negative and 
third-party information still discounted the GM-labeled foods, but by a smaller amount than the participants 
who received only negative information. Part G shows that participants who received negative and third-
party information discounted the GM-labeled foods by an average of seventeen to twenty-two percent, 
depending on the product. Participants who received positive, negative and third-party information were 
more accepting of the GM-labeled foods than those who received only positive and negative information. 
The participants who received positive, negative and third-party information discounted the GM-labeled 
food by an average of zero to eleven percent, depending on the product. 
 
Our results are consistent with Viscusi (1997) who found that individuals placed a slightly greater weight on 
negative information than positive information. In our auction, participants who received only positive 
information did not discount the GM-labeled food, while those who received only negative information 
discounted the GM-labeled food by an average of 35 percent. Those who received both positive and negative 
information put slightly more weight on the negative information, discounting the GM-labeled foods by 20 
percent. One explanation for the moderated effect (but not offset) of negative information when participants 
received both positive and negative GM-product information is that some individuals have an asymmetric 
value function, giving greater weight to marginal losses than to gains (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). Also, our results are in contrast to Fox et al.￿s (2002) who obtained the result that negative information 
dominated positive information. They argued that one reason could be due to a ￿status quo bias,￿ (or 
endowment effect) where participants were originally endowed with a regular pork sandwich and could bid 
to upgrade to an irradiated pork sandwich. Participants may have their bids biased due to being endowed 
with one type of sandwich.
5,6 Our auction had participants bid on items in separate rounds (trials), thus our 
results are not influenced by a ￿status quo bias.￿ 
 
Tables 3 and 4 display the percentages of participants who are out of the market for the GM-labeled 
commodities using both the strong and weak tests for being out of the market. The number of observations 
differs across products, because if an individual bids zero for both the GM-labeled and plain-labeled versions 
of a commodity, he/she is not included in the analysis (he/she did not demand the product, so we cannot 
determine his/her taste for genetic modification). Similarly, when reporting on who is out of the market for 
all GM-labeled foods, we do not include those who bid zero for all food products. Under both tests a 
significant share of participants￿9 to 24 percent--are out of the market, but a lower share for vegetable oil 
than for tortilla chips and russet potatoes. This arises because verifiable information pointed out that 
distillation and refinement of oils leaves only lipids and no GM-containing proteins. 
 
Table 3.  Percentage of Consumers who Bid Zero for a GM-Labeled Food Item.
# 
 
  Observations  Out of Market  Percent Out of Market 
All goods  165  17  10.3% 
Vegetable oil only  146  13  8.9% 
Tortilla chips only  155  20  12.9% 
Potatoes only  159  20  12.6% 
 
# 
When a consumer bids zero for the GM and non-GM version of a commodity their bids are not included. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Consumers Whose Bid for the GM-Labeled Food is Two- 
thirds the Amount They Bid for the Plain Labeled Food or Lower.
* 
 
  Observations  Out of Market  Percent Out of Market 
All goods  165  27  16.4% 
Vegetable oil only  146  28  19.2% 
Tortilla chips only  155  37  23.9% 
Potatoes only  159  35  22.0% 
* When a consumer bids zero for the GM and non-GM version of a commodity, their bids are not included. 
 
In Table 5 the dependent variable takes a one if a participant￿s bid for all three GM-labeled-food item is 
2/3rds or less than for the equivalent plain labeled food item. Other results are reported in Appendix B. The 
estimated coefficients from probit models fitted to data explain the probability that an auction participant is 
out of the market for all three GM-foods. The results show that release of anti-biotech information increases 
significantly the probability that a consumer is out of the market for GM-food items, i.e., negative 
information pushes consumers out of the market. This result has important implications. If an NGO wishes to 
slow scientific progress, it could disseminate large amounts of negative information, even if the information 
is highly biased. With asymmetric information, it could even disguise true intentions by telling consumers it 
wants to keep them ￿fully informed￿ of the consequences of a product or technology, or to be very cautious 
until all the negative claims are disproved￿the ￿precautionary principle.￿ Even if individuals do not fully 
believe the information, negative information will increase the uncertainty about a product or process, which 
has been shown to decrease the likelihood of adoption (Purvis et al. 1995).  With a significant reduction in consumer demand, supermarket managers may discontinue carrying an item, 
which reduces consumers￿ choices, and with a collapse in the market for the food item, farmers would 
discontinue using GM-technology. Given that technological change is one of the driving forces behind rising 
standards of living, stalling adoption of new goods broadly could lead to a significant reduction in future 
social welfare. 
 
Table 5. Probit Models: All Products ￿ Dependent Variable = 1 if a Consumer is out of the Market for All 
Three Products (for GM-labeled product bid is 2/3rds of bid for plain-labeled product) and 0 Otherwise. 
 
 



















  (0.410) (0.413) (0.421)  (0.515)  (0.456) (0.447) (0.543) (0.550) 
Anti_info  1.204 **  1.156 **  0.718 *  0.724 *  0.714 *  0.751 *  0.735 *  0.786 * 
  (0.437) (0.429) (0.384)  (0.391)  (0.384) (0.394) (0.400) (0.408) 
Pro_info      -0.613 **  -0.611 **  -0.619 **  -0.667 **  -0.687 **  -0.721 ** 
      (0.280)  (0.281)  (0.280) (0.285) (0.289) (0.298) 
Ver_info   -0.684  **          -0.666  ** 
   (0.309)          (0.274) 
Income      0.0034     -0.0034  0.0029 
      (0.0039)     (0.0040)  (0.0040) 
Labels        -0.033    -0.147  -0.108 
        (0.253)    (0.267)  (0.275) 
Informed          0.372  0.418  0.530  * 
          (0.259)  (0.273)  (0.285) 
  
** Significant at the 5% level 
*  Significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 5 shows that that when third-party, verifiable information is released it decreases significantly the 
probability that consumers are out of the market for GM-labeled foods. This provides evidence that a third-
party source that provides neutral, verifiable information on genetic modification and GM-foods could 
prevent markets for GM-foods from collapsing. In addition to the value verifiable information has by 
providing consumers with objective information on the risks and benefits of genetic modification (estimated 
in Rousu et al. (2002) at $2.6 billion), verifiable information can increase the number of real options that 
consumers have in supermarkets. 
 
Other results are that the release of pro-biotech information also reduces the probability of consumers￿ being 
out of the market for GM-food products. Although the ag biotech-industry perspective frequently gets bad 
press, our results imply that it can also reduce the probability of consumers being out of the market for GM-
labeled foods. In addition, consumers￿ pre-experiment beliefs are important factors for understanding the 
demand for GM-labeled foods. When a participant reported in our pre-experiment questionnaire that s/he 
was informed about GM-technology and products, s/he had a significantly higher probability of being out of 
the market for GM-foods (see table 5, model 8). 
 
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
This paper has provided new insights into and empirical evidence on factors affecting resistance to new 
products by consumers in a high income country. Our evidence is derived from unique data. We applied a 
sound statistical experimental design which randomly assigned labeling and information treatments to 
experimental units of adult consumers who participated in laboratory auction experiments of three food items 
that might be genetically modified. These were U.S. consumers who were free from the confounding effects 
such as experiencing the BSE crisis, Dioxin scandal, or having a predisposition towards ￿natural foods￿ that 
are present in European consumers.  We uncovered several important results. First, when participants saw GM-labeled foods rather than plain-
labeled foods, a significant share-- 9 to 24 percent-- were pushed out of the market for GM-food. Second, 
when participants received negative GM-information from environmental groups, they had a significantly 
higher probability of being out of the market for GM-labeled food items. Third, third-party verifiable 
information dissipates partially the effects of negative GM-information. Verifiable information can be an 
effective policy tool to moderate resistance to new products and to keep new food products as options in 
supermarkets, thereby increasing consumers￿ range of choices. 
 
Our results present an alternative explanation for Europeans￿ negligible demand for GM foods. European 
consumers have been far more critical of GM foods than U.S. consumers. There are several potential 
explanations for the divergence. One reason is that Europeans have had to deal with the BSE (Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy or Mad-Cow disease) crisis and other food scares recently that U.S. consumers 
have not encountered and that could explain why Europeans are more hesitant to accept new GM technology 
in food products (Gaskill, 2000). Some claim that Europeans have a strong preference for ￿natural￿ which 
may cause their resistance to GM technology (Zechendorf, 1998). An alternative interpretation of Europeans￿ 
low demand for GM-products is that NGOs, largely Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, have been more 
prevalent there than in the US, disseminating larger amounts of negative GM-information, creating 
skepticism and doubt about GM technology, and that no trusted source of verifiable information exists.  
 
Human malnutrition and starvation and sustainable development in Southern Africa are related to the 
resistance to GM-foods in the EU, and the resistance to GMOs in developed countries can be explained, at 
least in part, by the dissemination of negative GM-production information and demonstrating against these 
products by NGOs. Future research could actually conduct GM-auction experiments in the EU. But in the 
mean time, the plight of Southern Africa rests to some extent on changing food and agricultural trade 
policies of the rich countries. One such policy would be to establish and fund a new institution having as its 
objective to produce and distribute verifiable information on GM technology. This information would 
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Figure 2.  Information given to participants: Environmental group perspective 
 
The following is a collection of statements and information on genetic modification from Greenpeace, a 
leading environmental group. 
General Information 
Genetic modification is one of the most dangerous things being done to your food sources today.  There are 
many reasons that genetically modified foods should be banned, mainly because unknown adverse effects 
could be catastrophic!  Inadequate safety testing of GM plants, animals, and food products has occurred, so 
humans are the ones testing whether or not GM foods are safe.  Consumers should not have to test new food 
products to ensure that they are safe. 
Scientific Impact 
The process of genetic modification takes genes from one organism and puts them into another. This process 
is very risky.  The biggest potential hazard of genetically modified (GM) foods is the unknown. This is a 
relatively new technique, and no one can guarantee that consumers will not be harmed. Recently, many 
governments in Europe assured consumers that there would be no harm to consumers over mad-cow disease, 
but unfortunately, their claims were wrong.  We do not want consumers to be harmed by GM food. 
Human Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major health problems.  The potential exists for allergens to be 
transferred to a GM food product that no one would suspect.  For example, if genes from a peanut were 
transferred into a tomato, and someone who is allergic to peanuts eats this new tomato, they could display a 
peanut allergy. 
 
Another problem with genetically modified foods is a moral issue.  These foods are taking genes from one 
living organism and transplanting them into another.  Many people think it is morally wrong to mess around 
with life forms on such a fundamental level. 
Financial Impact 
GM foods are being pushed onto consumers by big businesses, which care only about their own profits and 
ignore possible negative side effects.  These groups are actually patenting different life forms that they 
genetically modify, with plans to sell them in the future.  Studies have also shown that GM crops may get 
lower yields than conventional crops. 
Environmental Impact 
Genetically modified foods could pose major environmental hazards.  Sparse testing of GM plants for 
environmental impacts has occurred.  One potential hazard could be the impact of GM crops on wildlife.  
One study showed that one type of GM plant killed Monarch butterflies.   
 
Another potential environmental hazard could come from pests that begin to resist GM plants that were 
engineered to reduce chemical pesticide application.  The harmful insects and other pests that get exposed to 
these crops could quickly develop tolerance and wipe out many of the potential advantages of GM pest 
resistance. 
 Figure 3.  Information given to participants: Industry perspective 
 
The following is collection of statements and information on genetic modification provided by a group of 
leading biotechnology companies, including Monsanto and Syngenta.   
General Information 
Genetically modified plants and animals have the potential to be one of the greatest discoveries in the history 
of farming.  Improvements in crops so far relate to improved insect and disease resistance and weed control. 
These improvements using bioengineering/GM technology lead to reduced cost of food production.  Future 
GM food products may have health benefits.  
Scientific Impact 
Genetic modification is a technique that has been used to produce food products that are approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).  Genetic engineering has brought new opportunities to farmers for 
pest control and in the future will provide consumers with nutrient enhanced foods. GM plants and animals 
have the potential to be the single greatest discovery in the history of agriculture.  We have just seen the tip 
of the iceberg of future potential.  
Human Impact 
The health benefits from genetic modification can be enormous.  A special type of rice called ￿golden rice￿ 
has already been created which has higher levels of vitamin A.  This could be very helpful because the 
disease Vitamin A Deficiency (VAD) is devastating in third-world countries.  VAD causes irreversible 
blindness in over 500,000 children, and is also responsible for over one million deaths annually.  Since rice 
is the staple food in the diets of millions of people in the third world, Golden Rice has the potential of 
improving millions of lives a year by reducing the cases of VAD. 
 
The FDA has approved GM food for human consumption, and Americans have been consuming GM foods 
for years.  While every food product may pose risks, there has never been a documented case of a person 
getting sick from GM food. 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified plants have reduced the cost of food production, which means lower food prices, and 
that can help feed the world.  In America, lower food prices help decrease the number of hungry people and 
also let consumers save a little more money on food.  Worldwide the number of hungry people has been 
declining, but increased crop production using GM technology can also help further reduce world hunger.  
Environmental Impact 
GM technology has produced new methods of insect control that reduce chemical insecticide application by 
50 percent or more.  This means less environmental damage.  GM weed control is providing new methods to 
control weeds, which are a special problem in no-till farming.  Genetic modification of plants has the 
potential to be one of the most environmentally helpful discoveries ever.  
 Figure 4.  Information given to participants: Independent, third-party information 
 
The following is a statement on genetic modification approved by a third-party group, consisting of a variety 
of individuals knowledgeable about genetically modified foods, including scientists, professionals, religious 
leaders, and academics.  These parties have no financial stake in genetically modified foods. 
General Information 
Bioengineering is a type of genetic modification where genes are transferred across plants or animals, a 
process that would not otherwise occur (In common usage, genetic modification means bioengineering).  
With bioengineered pest resistance in plants, the process is somewhat similar to the process of how a flu shot 
works in the human body.  Flu shots work by injecting a virus into the body to help make a human body 
more resistant to the flu.  Bioengineered plant-pest resistance causes a plant to enhance its own pest 
resistance. 
Scientific Impact 
The Food and Drug Administration standards for GM food products (chips, cereals, potatoes, etc.) are based 
on the principle that they have essentially the same ingredients, although they have been modified slightly 
from the original plant materials.   
 
Oils made from bioengineered oil crops have been refined, and this process removed essentially all the GM 
proteins, making them like non-GM oils.  So even if GM crops were deemed to be harmful for human 
consumption, it is doubtful that vegetable oils would cause harm. 
Human Impact 
While many genetically modified foods are in the process of being put on your grocers￿ shelf, there are 
currently no foods available in the U.S. where genetic modification has increased nutrient content. All foods 
present a small risk of an allergic reaction to some people.  No FDA approved GM food poses any known 
unique human health risks. 
Financial Impact 
Genetically modified seeds and other organisms are produced by businesses that seek profits.  For farmers to 
switch to GM crops, they must see benefits from the switch.  However, genetic modification technology may 
lead to changes in the organization of the agri-business industry and farming.  The introduction of GM foods 
has the potential to decrease the prices to consumers for groceries. 
Environmental Impact 
The effects of genetic modification on the environment are largely unknown. Bioengineered insect resistance 
has reduced farmers￿ applications of environmentally hazardous insecticides.  More studies are occurring to 
help assess the impact of bioengineered plants and organisms on the environment.  A couple of studies 
reported harm to Monarch butterflies from GM crops, but other scientists were not able to recreate the 
results. The possibility of insects growing resistant to GM crops is a legitimate concern.    Appendix Table A.  2000 Census of Population Demographic Characteristics of the Two Survey Areas: Polk 
County, IA (including Des Moines area) and Ramsey County, MN (including St. Paul area). 
 











Age Median  age  45.7  45.7  45.7 
Married  1 if the individual is married *  59.5  51.4  55.5 
Education  Years of schooling **  13.52  13.76  13.64 
Income  The median households income level (in 
thousands) 
46.1 45.7  45.9 
White  1 if participant is white  0.9  0.8  0.85 
________________________________________________________________________ 
All variables are for individuals of all ages, except for Married, which is for individuals 18 years or older, 
Education, which is for individuals 25 or older, and age, which is for individuals 20 or older. 
* The estimate of the number of married people who are 18 or older was obtained by taking the number of people 
married over 15 and assuming that the number of people were married at ages 15, 16, and 17 were zero ￿ this gives 
the percentage of people who are married who are 18 or older. 
** The years of schooling was estimated by placing a value of 8 for those who have not completed 9
th grade, 10.5 
for those who have not completed high school, 12 for those who have completed high school but have had no 
college, 13.5 for those with some college but no degree, 14 for those with an associate￿s degree, 16 for those with a 
bachelor￿s degree, and 18 for those with a graduate or professional degree. 
 
Appendix B.  Table 1.  Probit model: All products - Dependent variable = 1 if a Consumer is out of the 
Market for all Three Products (i.e. bid = 0) and 0 Otherwise
1 (Standard errors in parentheses, N=172) 
Regressors  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Intercept  -2.045 **  -1.992 **  -1.262 **  -1.673 **  -1.818 **  -1.443 **  -2.190 **  -2.090 ** 
  (0.410) (0.444) (0.449)  (0.567)  (0.540) (0.479)  (0.645) (0.649) 
Anti_info  0.764 *  0.753 *  0.395 0.493  0.461  0.410 0.537  0.543 
  (0.448) (0.447) (0.406)  (0.420)  (0.525) (0.421)  (0.445) (0.446) 
Pro_info      -0.549 *  -0.521  -0.525  -0.644 *  -0.580 *  -0.590 * 
    (0.320)  (0.324)  (0.330)  (0.335)  (0.345)  (0.347) 
Ver_info   -0.099          -0.307 
   (0.334)          (0.297) 
Income      0.0053     0.0043  0.0044 
      (0.0042)     (0.0044)  (0.0042) 
Labels          0.728 **    0.644 *  0.661 * 
        (0.326)    (0.336)  (0.338) 
Informed         0.456  0.282  0.336 
         (0.290)  (0.307)  (0.313) 
 
 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*  Significant at the 10% level 





1 In 1973, Cohen and Boyer discovered the basic technique for recombinant DNA, which launched a new 
field of genetic engineering.  The Cohen-Boyer patent on gene-splicing technology was awarded in 1980 to 
Stanford University and the University of California (Office of Technology Assessment 1989).  They built 
on the 1953 discovery by Watson and Crick of the structure of DNA and of the suggestion about how it 
replicates. 
2 Southern Africa, which has limited rainfall and irrigation water and unfavorable soils was largely bypassed 
by the Green Revolution (Johnson 2002). 
3 Binenbaum et al. 2003 emphasize that international and national agricultural research centers have far 
greater freedom currently to operate in agricultural research oriented toward food crops for the developing 
world than is commonly perceived.  They are generally able to operate in regions where most modern 
technologies are unprotected by IPRs. Unlicensed production in developing countries of crops protected only 
in the developed countries is both legal and moral per se. 
4 Compared with the clear and immediate danger posed by the short and long-term effects of malnutrition 
and starvation (Fogel 1994), the possibilities of being poisoned by Frankenfood seem rather remote. Also, 
Qaim and Zilberman (2003) have shown that Bt cotton in India increased cotton yields significantly because 
farmers do not have access to good, cheap pesticides, reduced the environmental load of chemical pesticides, 
and reduced worker pesticide contamination. 
5 Recall that our participants are only given money and no physical commodity, and this minimizes the 
endowment effects. 
6  In the Fox et al. (2002) paper the negative information about irradiated meat included consumers 
potentially getting cancer.  In our anti-biotech information, the worst human health outcomes mentioned 
were relatively mild, e.g., allergic reactions. 